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ABSTRACT 
 
This Note initially discusses fundamental problems created by the 
“freedom of contract” principle that arise in an era where the imbalance 
of both wealth and political power are at their highest rates seen in years. 
This Note also discusses the principles at work in current labor law: 
(1) how it is influenced by neoclassical economics and, (2) how, in the 
alternative, both the related legal doctrine and practice of collective 
bargaining can improve by incorporating behavioral economics, 
neuroeconomics, and game theory. Labor law practitioners and shapers 
should recognize neoclassical economics’ shortcomings and adopt a more 
efficient contractual process that leads to more just and efficient 
outcomes. 
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―Law still struggles to induce people to behave more 
constructively.‖ 
—Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith1 
―Law is intended to create context in which cooperative and other 
socially optimal behaviour is beneficial‖ 
—Terrence Chorvat & Kevin McCabe2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
United States labor law suffers from adherence to a neoclassical 
economic framework, a poor model for predicting, shaping, and 
explaining human behavior. Deference to neoclassical economics in 
constructing and interpreting labor law creates inefficiency and 
dysfunction in the American labor market. This hurts both labor unions 
and business owners. Despite the sometimes contentious debate in this 
area of law, there is potential for common ground and positive change in 
how we understand labor law and, more specifically, bargaining over 
contracts. 
This Note initially discusses fundamental problems created by the 
―freedom of contract‖ principle that arise in an era where the imbalance of 
both wealth and political power are at their highest rates seen in years. 
This Note also discusses the principles currently at work in labor law: 
(1) how it is influenced by neoclassical economics and, (2) how, in the 
 
 
 1. Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 
405, 408 (2005). 
 2. Terrence Chorvat & Kevin McCabe, The Brain and the Law, 359 PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC. 
LOND. B. 1727, 1733 (2004). 
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alternative, both the related legal doctrine and practice of collective 
bargaining can improve by incorporating behavioral economics, 
neuroeconomics, and game theory. Labor law practitioners and shapers 
should recognize neoclassical economics‘ shortcomings and adopt a more 
efficient contractual process that leads to more just and efficient outcomes. 
II. THE HISTORIC POWER IMBALANCE CREATED BY  
UNITED STATES LABOR LAW 
Labor law doctrine is an outgrowth of contract law,
3
 yet it has 
sometimes paradoxically constrained workers‘ right to contract and 
bargaining leverage. The initial jurisprudential outlook on labor-employer 
relations stemmed from the pre-19th century ―master-servant‖ legal 
doctrine of England and the United States.
4
 The prevailing attitude was 
that ―[t]he capitalist is fond of declaring that labor is a commodity, and the 
wage contract a bargain of purchase and sale like any other.‖5 This view 
ends up depersonalizing the relationship between the worker and the 
employer, making it solely one of economic convenience.
6
 In one light, 
[t]o separate labor from other activities of life and to subject it to the 
laws of the market was to annihilate all organic forms of existence 
and to replace them by a different type of organization, and 
atomistic and individualistic one. Such a scheme of destruction was 
best served by the application of the principle of freedom of 
contract.
7
 
The early results were stark. During the 19th and early 20th century, 
―freedom of contract‖ produced poor working conditions for most 
American workers. The United States government, in response to worker 
concerns amplified during the Great Depression, passed the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
8
 and subsequent amendments.
9
 One policy 
 
 
 3. Karl E. Klare, Critical Theory and Labor Relations Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A 
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 61, 73 (David Kairys ed., 1990). 
 4. JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 13 (1983). 
 5. HARRY BRAVERMAN, LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL: THE DEGRADATION OF WORK IN 
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 97 (1974). 
 6. Klare, supra note 3, at 73. 
 7. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 163 (1944). 
 8. See National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 451 (codified as amended at 
29 U.S.C. §§ 151–180 (2006)). 
 9. See also Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–187 (1994)); Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure 
Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86–257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 
U.S.C.)). 
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aim was to create a demand-side/worker-side stimulus to ―strengthen[] 
unions so that the purchasing power of workers would increase, thereby 
avoiding future economic depressions.‖10 Another aim was to encourage 
more of a seller‘s market for labor in an era where widespread poverty and 
unemployment left individual workers with little leverage when seeking 
and maintaining employment. 
Before the NLRA became law, however, liberals and conservatives 
debated whether employment bargaining should take place in a totally 
―free‖ market, regulated only by common law, or, in the alternative, 
whether the NLRA should reconstruct that market to advance employee 
rights.
11
 The final result was mixed; once the right to bargain collectively 
was established, the law receded into the background and ―refrain[ed] 
from any further attempts to redistribute power or steer the substantive 
content of employment contracts.‖12 Thus, the NLRA was crafted to give 
workers bargaining power to transform the ―anarchy of the marketplace, 
which exploited workers, into the harmony of a modern cooperative 
capitalism, which protected workers.‖13 
Despite this aim, the NLRA authors understood labor-employer 
relations as two parties at a bargaining table: on one side, workers, and on 
the other side, employers. ―[S]tanding opposed to each other are these two 
rights: The right of the employer to a free labor market, and the right of the 
striking employés in their strife with him to impair that freedom.‖14 This 
jurisprudence, rooted in an adversarial view, created a zero-sum game. 
Each side competed for finite sets of rights, powers, and economic value. 
The NLRA gave workers more leverage, but it did not stray from the 
notion that the most preferable method of wage-setting was unlimited 
adversarial contract negotiations. 
Thus, the Act did not address the notion that ―freedom of contract‖ and 
the bargaining method itself is problematic.
15
 Under the freedom of 
contract framework, there is an assumption that each side bargains from a 
 
 
 10. ATLESON, supra note 4, at 67 (citing the National Labor Relations Act § 1; 29 U.S.C § 151 
(1970)); see also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (quoting American Steel 
Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209 (1921)). 
 11. Klare, supra note 3, at 79. 
 12. Id. 
 13. James B. Atleson, Wartime Labor Regulation, the Industrial Pluralists, and the Law of 
Collective Bargaining, in INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 143, 143 (Howell John Harris & 
Nelson Lichtenstein eds., 1993). 
 14. Ellen M. Kelman, American Labor Law and Legal Formalism: How “Legal Logic” Shaped 
and Vitiated the Rights of American Workers, 58 ST. JOHN‘S L. REV. 1, 24 (quoting L. D. Willcutt & 
Sons v. Bricklayers‘ Benevolent and Protective Union No. 3, 200 Mass. 110, 85 N.E. 897 (1908)). 
 15. Klare, supra note 3, at 73. 
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position of strength, that any contract formed is one of mutual assent, and 
that the outcome sets an equitable price. Yet courts have historically read 
into contracts ―‗implied‘ terms which reserved to the employer the full 
authority and direction of employees.‖16 Thus, it is unclear whether 
workers really ever had full ―freedom of contract‖ in the first place. 
The idea that workers are free to contract is flawed further because 
employees can be backed into bargaining away already existing statutory 
rights. In the Boys Markets case, employees contractually gave up their 
right to strike.
17
 According to Karl Klare, if 
the background to bargaining is one of enormous and pervasive 
inequality (as is typical in the workplace), a legal regime that makes 
rights under employee protective statutes freely waivable effectively 
permits employers to deploy their economic power so as to dilute or 
undermine whatever victories employees have won in the 
legislature, with the consequence that self-determination is 
decreased rather than enhanced by free contract.
18
 
The end result is that the NLRA was not completely effective in achieving 
a balance in bargaining power between well-positioned firms and their 
poorly-leveraged workers. Yet the philosophical parent to the notion of 
freedom of contract—neoclassic economics—―place[s] an imprimatur of 
legitimacy on the outcomes of collective bargaining, no matter how 
parsimonious or inequitable they may be.‖19 Thus, current labor law 
framework legitimizes bargained-for contracts that nonetheless produce 
unequal or unjust outcomes. 
Furthermore, ―[t]he right to strike is granted because the threat to 
withdraw labor power, or its actual withdrawal, is the only employee 
action that will make collective bargaining effective.‖20 Yet, the act of a 
strike requires the sacrifice of needs far more basic than the opportunity to 
make profit. Employers sacrifice future profits, but employees sacrifice 
vital funds that they use to pay for food, shelter, and monthly living 
expenses. Additionally, court-imposed
21
 and statutory
22
 limits on unions‘ 
 
 
 16. Atleson, supra note 13, at 14. 
 17. Klare, supra note 3, at 77. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. ATLESON, supra note 4, at 7. 
 21. See generally NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938) (allowing 
employers to permanently replace workers on strike for economic reasons, so long as the employer has 
not committed a separate labor law violation). 
 22. See § 8(b)(4) of the NLRA (effectively banning secondary boycotts).  
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striking power make it difficult to wield their only significant weapon 
without disastrous economic consequences. Although the NLRA gives 
workers the power of collectivity to counterbalance a firm‘s superior 
bargaining position, this right to collective action is often not enough to 
overcome this imbalance, especially in a more globalized economy where 
buyers of labor have significantly increased leverage. 
Other important problems with labor law include the wedge it drives 
between organized and unorganized sectors of the workforce and its 
privatization of welfare functions.
23
 Labor law ―uncouple[s] the concerns 
of unorganized low-wage workers from the labor movement‘s political 
agenda, to the ultimate detriment of both groups.‖24 The NLRA 
fragmented the lower class‘s political and socioeconomic power and pitted 
class members against each other.
25
 This eroded the political strength of 
each group. Fragmentation has led to legislative hostility and indifference 
to workers. This is exemplified by recently-passed free trade agreements—
the passage of which relied on the promise of new, albeit non-union 
jobs—which have diminished workers‘ bargaining leverage and widened 
the power gap between capital and workers.
26
 
Even with the right to collectively bargain, freedom of contract does 
not work when socioeconomic and political power is significantly out of 
balance, and when the law has faded into the background to let the ―free 
market‖ reign.27 In fact, the notion that absence of law or regulation leads 
to greater freedom is fundamentally flawed at its core.
28
 In many cases, the 
purported contractual freedom sustains the power imbalance, with the 
 
 
 23. Klare, supra note 3, at 83. 
 24. Id. 
 25. An example of the political polarization of labor issues in current events is that of the Labor 
protests in Wisconsin against Governor Scott Walker‘s attempts to strip away collective bargaining 
rights for state employees. For a summary of these events with citations to news stories, see 
Wikipedia, 2011 Wisconsin protests, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Wisconsin_protests (last 
accessed Nov. 2, 2012). 
 26. A well-known example is the North American Free Trade Agreement passed in 1993. 
 27. Klare, supra note 3, at 78. Klare notes ―the overall shape of the bargain is predominantly cast 
by the background economic context which in our society is generally one of profound 
employer/employee inequality and massive corporate power, even throughout most of the dwindling 
unionized sector.‖ Id. 
 28. This notion is captured by the passage: ―[G]overning doesn‘t disappear when government 
shrinks; instead corporations come to govern your life—like HMO‘s, oil companies, drug companies, 
agribusiness, and so on, with accountability only to maximizing profit, not to public needs.‖ George 
Lackoff, ―Where’s the Movement?‖, HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 25, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost 
.com/george-lakoff/wheres-the-movement_b_435045.html (last accessed Nov. 2, 2012). The power to 
govern doesn‘t necessarily stem from laws. It can just as easily stem from economic might. In the 
bargaining context, economic prowess alone gives one leverage to negotiate a favorable deal even in 
the absence of laws or regulations.  
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entities having the least amount of power consistently getting the short end 
of the deal. Yet ―[w]hen it comes to setting wage rates and working 
conditions, the law most definitely does not favor administrative or 
regulatory techniques.‖29 This Note argues that a more structured process 
will produce a more efficient and just bargaining process, and reduce 
destructive behavior—the benefits of which can be reaped by both workers 
and ownership. 
III. THE CURRENT PARADIGM: NEOCLASSICAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 
JURISPRUDENCE  
For decades, courts and legislatures have used neoclassical economics 
to construct and interpret laws that shape human behavior. Related 
scholarship grew into a field, appropriately titled ―law and economics.‖ 
Gary Becker explains law and economics‘ cornerstone assumptions: ―[A]ll 
human behavior can be viewed as involving participants who 1) maximize 
their utility, 2) form a stable set of preferences, and 3) accumulate an 
optimal amount of information and other inputs in a variety of markets.‖30 
A consequence of these assumptions is the ―rational actor,‖ personified as 
―Homo Economicus,‖ representing the idea that all human economic 
actors act rationally when carrying out market transactions.
31
 As Cass 
Sunstein explains, ―The task of law and economics is to determine the 
implications of such rational maximizing behavior in and out of markets, 
and its legal implications for markets and other institutions.‖32 Rational 
Choice Theory (RCT) holds that the price of any good—tangible or 
intangible—traded on a market is set by a rational buyer and seller.33 Each 
party negotiates a price in between the good‘s true value to the buyer and 
the true value to the seller. Parties increase their economic utility by 
executing the transaction, provided these values overlap. This utility 
maximizing behavior is considered rational because the execution of the 
transaction leads to economic gains for both parties.
34
 
 
 
 29. Klare, supra note 3, at 73. 
 30. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (1976). 
 31. Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 
405, 443 (2005). 
 32. Cass R. Sunstein, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 
1476 (1998). 
 33. Andrew M. Colman, Cooperation, Psychological Game Theory, and Limitations of 
Rationality in Social Interaction, 26 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCI. 139, 139 (2003). 
 34. Id. at 141. 
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Taken a step further, many neoclassical economists argue that market 
transactions bargained at arm‘s length create self-regulating pricing. If a 
seller asks too high a price, he must lower it or the buyer will walk away. 
Neoclassical economics also predicts that humans will respond rationally 
to changes in these economic incentives.
35
 For example, if the price of a 
good goes up, people will buy less of it.
36
 Thus, neoclassical theory 
contends that market prices naturally gravitate toward a fair price, and 
backers of the theory contend that any outside intervention in price-setting 
is unnecessary and unjustifiably intrusive into private dealings. 
Some rational choice theorists recognize that economic actors consider 
not just economic value in a tangible sense, but intangible social value as 
well.
37
 However, these models retain the assumption that the economic 
actor will still act to maximize his own self-interest. Thus, neoclassical 
models can account for intangible and purely psychological value in their 
utility calculations, but they maintain that individual actors will still act 
self-interestedly. That intangible utility can be added into the utility 
maximizing calculation does not, however, tell a full or accurate story of 
human economic behavior.  
IV. THE EMERGING PARADIGM: BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Neoclassical economics has frequently failed to predict actual human 
behavior in various experiments. To use it as a model to describe behavior 
can lead to incorrect predictions. As Sunstein concludes, ―Traditional law 
and economics is largely based on the standard assumptions of 
neoclassical economics. These assumptions are sometimes useful but often 
false.‖38 The failure stems from its various assumptions—including those 
of rational actors,
39
 information symmetry,
40
 self-interested actors,
41
 and 
 
 
 35. See generally Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 31. 
 36. Sunstein, supra note 32, at 1481. 
 37. Michael P. Vandenbergh, Amanda R. Carrico, & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Regulation in the 
Behavioral Era, 95 MINN. L. REV. 715, 724 (2011). 
 38. Sunstein, supra note 32, at 1545. 
 39. Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 31, at 443. 
 40. Vandenbergh, supra note 37, at 743. Individuals make inefficient economic decisions, such 
as letting their cars idle for more than 30 seconds (―the average individual [] believes she should idle 
for over 4 minutes before it becomes cost-effective to turn off the vehicle‖) because they are unaware 
of the true utility of a potential economic action. 
 41. Id. at 732–33. Individuals may ―feel[] a sense of social connectedness or reciprocity with 
other individuals‖ and act in a generous, rather than self-interested fashion. In addition, ―individuals 
will go to great lengths to conform to the attitudes and beliefs of those around them, even when 
conforming violates known facts or one‘s own ideological worldview.‖ Id. 
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behavioral consistency
42—that do not necessarily occur in real life. In fact, 
there are systematic exceptions to these assumptions that cause the 
neoclassical model‘s predictive ability to be of little jurisprudential worth 
when it comes to price setting and bargaining. Thus, ―accounting for extra-
rational responses to social outcomes is an essential, but largely 
underappreciated, area of regulatory analysis.‖43 The core problem is that 
―some theory of how humans think underlies any coherent argument about 
the law.‖44 But current doctrine almost completely ignores this notion. 
Behavioral economics is a relatively new field of study that has attempted 
to fill this gap. Indeed, ―[l]aws are made by humans, and hence the study 
of human behavior is clearly pertinent to the study of law.‖45 
A. Human Behavior is Not Always Informed, Utilitarian, and Rational 
Information asymmetries are one example of how poor and irrational 
economic decisions can be made. Early work by economist Joseph Stiglitz 
uncovered the effect of information asymmetries on markets.
46
 If the seller 
and buyer have incomplete or imbalanced information about the entity 
being priced, this reduces Pareto efficiency, and utility will not be 
maximized. Pareto improvements are defined as adjustments that make 
one party to a deal better off without making another party worse off. 
Pareto efficient outcomes maximize the total value of the negotiation.
47
 
 
 
 42. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 
341, 341–42 (1983). Humans are also subject to ―framing‖ effects. If an economic decision is framed 
in terms of a loss, the subject is less likely to execute the transaction than when it is framed as a gain. 
Subjects in one study cited were asked to choose one of two options in two different exercises 
regarding the fate of 600 people. Exercise one: If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved 
(72% chose this). If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people will be 
saved and a two-thirds probability that no people will be saved (28% chose this). Exercise two: If 
Program C is adopted, 400 people will die (22% chose this). If Program D is adopted, there is a one-
third probability that nobody will die and a two-thirds probability that 600 people will die (78% chose 
this). The percentages were almost completely reversed, even though options A and C saved the same 
amount of people. The only difference was that option A was framed as a gain and option C was 
framed as a loss. Id. at 343–44. 
 43. Vandenbergh, supra note 37, at 724. 
 44. Oliver R. Goodenough, Mapping Cortical Areas Associated with Legal Reasoning and Moral 
Intuition, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 429, 432 (2001). 
 45. Terrence Chorvat, Kevin McCabe, and Vernon Smith, Law and Neuroeconomics, 13 S. CT. 
ECON. REV. 35, 36 (2005). 
 46. See generally Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Externalities in Economies with 
Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets, 101 Q.J. ECON. 229 (1986). 
 47. For a detailed discussion on Pareto efficiencies and outcomes, see DEEPAK MALHOTRA & 
MAX H. BAZERMAN, NEGOTIATION GENIUS 65–66 (2007). 
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These asymmetries are not the only example of how poor and irrational 
economic decisions are made. Endowment effects,
48
 self-serving biases,
49
 
and failure to ignore sunk costs
50
 are other instances where negotiators 
stray from rationality. Behavioral economics characterizes these events as 
examples of ―bounded rationality.‖51 In essence, the conclusion is that 
economic actors make irrational choices as a ―result of (a) constraints on 
time and energy for gathering perfect information and (b) constraints on 
the brain‘s information capacities, wiring, and computing speed.‖52 
Some of behavioral economics‘ most well-known findings come from 
experiments on participants in the ―ultimatum game.‖53 This game has two 
opposing participants. The first player is given a sum of money (for 
example, $10) and is to offer a percentage of it to the second player. The 
second player can then accept his offered share—in which case player one 
gets to keep the rest—or reject the offer, in which case both players get 
nothing. Neoclassical economics predicts that the second player will 
always accept any offer greater than zero, because the second player gets 
nothing if the offer is rejected. However, ―[o]ffers usually average 
between 30 percent and 40 percent of the total. Offers of less than 20 
percent are often rejected.‖54 In other words, in an ultimatum game where 
the ―pot‖ is $10, if the first player offers less than $2 to player two, player 
two will often reject the offer and opt to get no money. Thus, the second 
player will reject offers he or she feels are unfair even if it means 
foregoing financial gain. Similar results have been recorded across 
cultures and dollar amounts.
55
 Moreover, results have been known to differ 
when both players compete to earn the right to be the proposer. In these 
cases, initial offers are lower and acceptance rates of lower offers are 
higher.
56
 The fact that one player has ―earned‖ his right to propose alters 
decision-making and seems to give an imprimatur of legitimacy to the 
offeror‘s behavior, even though similar offers may be considered unfair 
under different circumstances. 
 
 
 48. Sunstein, supra note 32, at 1484. 
 49. Id. at 1501. 
 50. Id. at 1482–83. 
 51. Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 31, at 445. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1186–87 (1997). 
 54. Id. at 1186. 
 55. Colin Camerer and Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners, 9 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 209, 210–11 (1995). 
 56. NEUROECONOMICS: DECISION MAKING AND THE BRAIN 4 (Paul W. Glimcher et al. eds., 
2009). 
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Another experimental example involving union negotiations shows 
how self-serving biases can lead to bargaining impasses when negotiating 
teacher salaries.
57
 During contract negotiations in Pennsylvania school 
districts, custom dictated that both school boards and unions use the 
average of teacher salaries from nearby ―comparable‖ school districts in 
order to determine what teacher salaries should be in their own district.
58
 
Researchers surveyed school boards and union heads to determine which 
neighboring school districts were actually ―comparable.‖59 Where the 
surrounding districts all had similar salaries, comparison districts selected 
by the union had similar average salaries to those selected by the school 
board.
60
 But where surrounding districts exhibited wide variation in 
average salaries, unions tended to select comparison districts with higher 
average salaries. School boards also selected districts with lower average 
salaries.
61
 Thus, each side showed a self-serving bias because they selected 
districts with comparable average salaries favorable to their bargaining 
position. 
It is important to note that the selections in this study were not during 
actual negotiations. Researchers were the only audience, so participants 
had no strategic advantage to exaggerate the truth.
62
 It is possible that such 
comparison district selections reflected behavior derived from a strategic 
bargaining technique. But even if this is so, unions and boards should 
theoretically settle on some midpoint. To investigate whether this 
occurred, researchers examined the past propensity for strikes in each 
school district surveyed. In districts where the survey-reported divide 
between board and union comparable district salaries was greater than 
$1000, strikes were 49 percent more likely to occur.
63
 
Neoclassical economic theory‘s assumption that actors negotiate 
rationally is inconsistent with these results. Participants had no economic 
interest in submitting salaries favorable to their organizations to 
researchers. Furthermore, organizations in school districts with greater 
variance in surrounding-district salaries had no reason to strike more often. 
This irrational behavior occurred in a controlled experiment when 
participants knew they were being observed, and there was no real value at 
 
 
 57. Linda Babcock, Xianghong Wang, George Lowenstein, Choosing the Wrong Pond: Social 
Comparisons in Negotiations that Reflect a Self-Serving Bias, 111 Q.J. ECON. 1 (1996). 
 58. Id. at 3. 
 59. Id. at 8. 
 60. Id. at 10–12. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 17–18. 
 63. Id. at 13. 
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stake. When applied to real-life situations, negotiations have more 
potential to get contentious and irrational. As such, these findings cast 
serious doubt on the ―rational actor‖ assumption. 
B. Game Theory and Economics 
Game theory also indicates that price negotiations can lead to irrational 
and Pareto-inefficient results. The Prisoner‘s Dilemma is one example. It 
involves a scenario where utility is maximized if two players cooperate. 
However, cooperating when the other party fails to do so leads to loss for 
the cooperating party and gain for the non-cooperating party. This means 
trust in your opponent‘s motives is a large factor. Two players each choose 
one of two ―strategies‖ and simultaneously reveal their choices to one 
another. If Player 1 and Player 2 both choose strategy A (the cooperation 
strategy), they each get six points.
64
 But if Player 1 chooses to cooperate, 
and Player 2 chooses to defect, Player 1 gets zero points and Player 2 gets 
four points. If both players choose to defect, they each get only two points. 
The most efficient outcome is the dual-cooperation strategy. Each player 
nets six points in that case. However, if Player 1 suspects Player 2 is going 
to defect, it behooves Player 1 to defect as well. Player 1 will get two 
points as opposed to zero. 
Contrary to what the neoclassical model would predict, games usually 
do not proceed with both players choosing to cooperate—thus utility is not 
maximized. When one player first defects, both players frequently start 
defecting in later rounds in order to protect themselves. The game can 
quickly descend into a dystopia of mistrust and inefficiency. Neoclassical 
economics does not account for this behavior, and thus it is given little 
attention in labor law. Yet prisoner‘s dilemmas often occur in the real 
world, especially during negotiations. If both labor and management are 
negotiating towards a mid-point, one side may not want to give in if it 
does not trust the other side to give up an equal amount in response. Lack 
of trust causes uncooperative behavior such as strikes or lockouts. In these 
cases, both parties generally lose.  
 
 
 64. The point values can differ, but it is their relative values to other options that make the game 
what it is. 
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V. NEUROECONOMICS JURISPRUDENCE 
The brain dictates human behavior, and psychological studies routinely 
find that even the most intelligent and well-educated individuals make 
irrational decisions. Neuroeconomics examines the pattern of brain 
activity that occurs during economic decision-making. It stems from 
cognitive neuroscience, which ―integrates psychology, biochemistry, 
neurology, evolutionary biology, and related sciences in order to further 
our understanding of human behavior.‖65 
Neuroeconomics, like behavioral economics, suggests that legal 
doctrine should not be based on the rational actor assumption. It suggests 
that not all decisions are made with the rational part of the mind. In fact, 
―[u]nder the influence of powerful emotions or drives, people often end up 
doing the opposite of what they think is best for them, even at the moment 
of acting.‖66 If laws are meant to be read, comprehended, and obeyed, it is 
difficult to deny that laws ―interact with neural mechanisms to create 
behaviour.‖67 If we are to create prudent laws, it is only common sense to 
incorporate how our brains actually process information into our 
jurisprudential framework. 
A. The Mind: The Foundation and Origin for Law 
Research by linguist Noam Chomsky has developed and expanded on 
the concept of ―universals,‖ that is, the existence of mental themes 
consistent throughout all human cultures. Such universals include the 
concepts of fairness, property, reciprocal exchange, and the rejection of 
murder, among others.
68
 Much has already been said about mental 
structures and processes being the origin of human language and thought 
patterns.
69
 ―The language faculty is a distinct system of the mind/brain, 
with an initial state so common to the species . . . and apparently unique to 
 
 
 65. Terrence Chorvat & Kevin McCabe, Neuroeconomics and Rationality, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1235, 1247 (2005). 
 66. Sandra Blakeslee, Brain Experts Now Follow the Money, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2003, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/17/science/brain-experts-now-follow-the-money.html? 
pagewanted =all&src=pm (quoting Dr. George Lowenstein). 
 67. Terrence Chorvat & Kevin McCabe, The Brain and the Law, 359 PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC. 
LOND. B. 1727, 1728 (2004). 
 68. Scott Fruehwald, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Postmodern Legal Thought and Cognitive 
Science, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 375, 405 (2006). 
 69. See generally NOAM CHOMSKY, KNOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE: ITS NATURE, ORIGIN, AND USE 
(1986). 
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it in essential respects.‖70 Chomsky has suggested that what is true of 
language is also true in other areas where human beings acquire 
knowledge. Cognitive science has confirmed this by showing universals in 
many areas.
71
 This has implications for legal jurisprudence because the 
law itself could be an extension of principles physically encoded into our 
brains. Legal themes that transcend cultural and political boundaries could 
very well be biologically ingrained principles, built by years of 
evolutionary forces. ―An evolutionary perspective should uniquely predict 
that the same general sets of [universals] are central features of legal 
systems in virtually every human culture worldwide.‖72 
Mental concepts like the desire for ―fairness‖ in economic exchanges 
provide an evolutionary advantage. Individuals that have no problem 
making uneven exchanges bent out of their favor would be less likely to 
survive. The concept of personal property, at least to some extent, may be 
equally demanded by evolutionary pressures. One who is familiar with the 
concept of personal ownership is more likely to hoard and protect 
resources for survival. Similarly, it is easy to see how rejection of murder 
would be universal to a species that thrives communally. The presence of 
behavioral tendencies and reactions encoded into our brains at birth and 
reinforced later in life is hardly a groundbreaking idea. However, this idea 
is foreign to the prevalent jurisprudential area of legal positivism. 
Oliver Goodenough postulates that the impulses from these complex 
brain mechanisms 
are so compelling that the perception, at the conscious level in some 
structure . . . is one of unquestionable and universal validity. The 
apparent tautology of ought to ought . . . comes from the structure 
of the brain itself; ―ought‖ is not without context, but rather is the 
conclusion of approval given by the portion of the brain that 
analyzes action in the light of the unspoken algorithm of acceptable 
behavior.
73
 
Thus, the process of lawmaking may very well include the process of 
―translating the unarticulated models of natural justice into the articulated 
rules of positive law.‖74 
 
 
 70. Id. at 25. 
 71. Fruehwald, supra note 68, at 405. 
 72. Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 31, at 471. 
 73. Goodenough, supra note 44, at 439 (emphasis in original). 
 74. Id. 
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B. The Role of Behavioral Biology 
Owen Jones and Timothy Goldsmith argue that behavioral biology and 
evolutionary pressures may have created preferences for certain legal 
concepts.
75
 They note that, in current jurisprudence, there is a ―near-total 
absence of recognition in legal thinking that all behavior, and all the brain 
activity that perceives and directs it, are fundamentally biological 
phenomena, rendering the study of behavior biology manifestly relevant to 
any deep and current understanding of how and why humans behave in 
ways important to the law.‖76 They also note, however, that behavioral 
biology merely ―provides one important component of many necessary to 
any firm foundation for understanding human behavior.‖77 
One of the strongest arguments for behavioral biology‘s influence on 
law is the presence of behavioral predispositions and the proclivity ―to 
learn some behaviors far more easily than others.‖78 Humans learn the 
same socially beneficial behaviors our laws attempt to promote, even in 
cultures with very crude or rudimentary legal codes. This suggests that law 
may come from a biological, rather than textual, source—a reflection of 
behaviors we are already biologically inclined to favor and promote. One 
example of seemingly law-influenced behavior appearing across cultures 
is inheritance laws. There is a noted similarity among almost all human 
cultures regarding the presence of these laws.
79
 Evolutionary analysis 
predicts such an occurrence because ―natural selection has inclined people 
to care more for relatives than for nonrelatives, all else being equal.‖80 
Similarly, animals demonstrate some ―human‖ behaviors even in the 
absence of language and cognitive skills necessary to derive their behavior 
from law. For example, ―[i]n recent work on higher primates, 
primatologists, behavioral scientists, and anthropologists have found 
instances of cooperation, reciprocity, reconciliation after conflict, 
deception of other members of the social group, division of labor, sharing 
of production, [and] adverse reaction to distributional inequities . . . .‖81 
Thus, behaviors familiar with our concept of justice seem to thrive even in 
populations of beings that cannot read the law. 
 
 
 75. See generally Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 31. 
 76. Id. at 419. 
 77. Id. at 412. 
 78. Id. at 424. 
 79. Fruehwald, supra note 68, at 407. 
 80. Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 31, at 470. 
 81. Id. at 467. 
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Furthermore, in practice humans exhibit more cooperative behavior 
than the completely self-interested rational actor would display.
82
 In 
humans, ―[a] predisposition toward selectively cooperative behavior that is 
directed toward others who cooperate usually yields higher reproductive 
success than persistent selfishness.‖83 Moreover, ―[u]nrestrained self-
interest is an impossible strategy for living among others.‖84 Thus, it could 
be that spitefully rejecting another‘s selfish offer in an ultimatum game in 
order to punish the other for acting unfairly is evolutionarily adaptive. The 
―spiteful actor‖ maintains a reputation that he or she will not be cheated.85 
Although this concept could raise the question of whether defecting in the 
previously discussed ultimatum game is ultimately rational, to consider 
this ―self-interested‖ behavior would broaden the concept far beyond the 
current neoclassic price-setting use of the term.  
The notions of cooperation and trust have little place in a world where 
self-interested and calculating ―rational actors‖ seek only to maximize 
their own utility. However, trust is culturally valued, and it fosters 
mutually beneficial relationships. As a result, trust and reliance on others‘ 
good faith are promoted in many areas our legal code. But these concepts 
are not fully accounted for in neoclassical economic theory. As a result, 
problems and inefficiencies that arise from lack of trust are not effectively 
addressed in the doctrine of labor law. 
C. Neuroeconomics: The Brain Itself and Economic Decision-making 
Even if, as legal positivists assert, law comes from rational principles 
beyond our physical brains, there is no reason why these principles should 
make false assumptions about human behavior. Behavioral economics 
indicates that humans do not always make rational economic decisions. 
Neuroeconomics offers some insight on why this might be. 
First, it is important to consider how the brain has developed: 
Humans are confronted with only a finite, although very large set of 
problems. Solving the specific problems presented, and having 
tissues structured for solving those problems would be more 
 
 
 82. See supra Part IV. 
 83. Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 31, at 431. 
 84. Id. at 440. 
 85. Id. at 442. 
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efficient than having general purpose tissues, which would likely be 
more costly, and not well adapted.
86
 
Thus, the human brain would be at an evolutionary advantage to have 
many specialized problem-solving areas. This anatomically specialized 
concept of the brain is reinforced by the fact that ―neurons in different 
areas of the brain exhibit different types of cytoarchitecture.‖87 
Furthermore, early studies on people with damage to different parts of the 
brain show that only certain behaviors are affected following injury, while 
other behaviors are left almost completely intact.
88
 For example, ―patients 
with damage to the ventromedial [prefrontal cortex] are unlikely to exhibit 
emotional responses to stimuli, whereas those patients with dorsolateral 
[prefrontal cortex] damage appear to have problems in cognitive 
processing of tasks that do not seem to evoke emotional processing.‖89 
Similarly, researchers have identified the anterior cingulate cortex 
(―ACC‖) as part of the brain that is involved in mental conflict 
resolution.
90
 The ACC registers a conflict between two different 
processing regions in the brain, and helps to sort out which region 
ultimately prevails.
91
 Moreover, trust, as made apparent in game theory 
experiments,
92
 requires individuals to have a theory about what others are 
thinking, known as a theory of mind (―TOM‖).93 ―The primary areas 
involved in deriving the TOM appear to be the medial [prefrontal cortex], 
the related area of the [orbital frontal cortex], paracingulate cortex, the 
temporal poles, and the posterior [superior temporal sulcus].‖94 Thus, 
differing brain functions are segregated to different areas of the brain. 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging brain scans of players playing 
the ―ultimatum game‖ discussed above show neural activity in differing 
parts of the brain depending on whether an economic decision involves a 
 
 
 86. Chorvat & McCabe, supra note 67, at 1728. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 1729. See also Goodenough, supra note 44, at 434. The most famous early case 
involves the story of Phineas Gage, a railroad worker who, in 1848, had a long railroad spike driven 
through his head. The heat and speed with which the spike passed through his skull sterilized and 
cauterized the wound, and Gage survived despite the limited medical technology at the time. 
Miraculously, he had no impairment of movement, and his memory and intelligence were normal. 
However, he suffered from a sudden lack of social convention, and spoke abundant profanities and 
would never honor his social commitments. Gage‘s injury was reconstructed many years later and used 
to map functions of the brain. 
 89. Chorvat & McCabe, supra note 67, at 1728. 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. 
 92. See supra Part IV.B (discussing game theory and its effects on economic decision-making). 
 93. Chorvat & McCabe, supra note 67, at 1729. 
 94. Id. 
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rational calculation or has extra-rational content relating to ―fairness.‖95 
Unfair offers resulted in activation of both the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (cognitive processing area) and the anterior insula (an area known 
to be active during negative emotional experiences).
96
 Moreover, there was 
higher activity in the insula for rejected offers than there was for accepted 
offers.
97
 Rejected offers, of course, result in the economic actor forgoing 
economic gain. There was also ACC activation during all offers. This 
suggests that the brain was balancing information from both rational and 
emotional areas.
98
 
Further evidence suggests that punishment in a Pareto-inefficient 
Prisoner‘s Dilemma context can even activate the same reward system in 
the brain affected by addictive drug use.
99
 Numerous studies and 
pharmacological experiments have shown that the neurotransmitter 
dopamine is released in specific areas of the brain when a subject gains a 
desired ―reward.‖100 Specifically, dopaminergic neurons (responsible for 
the chemical‘s release) have been shown to be present in the prefrontal 
cortex (near the front of the brain, used for logical exercises and learning), 
and the striatum (located deep in the middle of the brain), ―a potential 
venue for the integration of movement and motivational information.‖101 
Recent neuroimaging studies have shown that dopamine is released in the 
striatum during highly arousing situations that elicit motivation, such as 
playing a video game that gives out monetary rewards.
102
 Most 
importantly, however, are studies that show these very same areas are 
activated when participants playing the Prisoner‘s Dilemma game exact 
revenge on defectors; a result ―interpreted by the authors as a rewarding 
feeling resulting from the punishment of perceived unfairness.‖103 These 
results suggest that destructive behavior might end up becoming 
rewarding, leading to Pareto-inefficient outcomes in situations like 
collective bargaining. 
In a different example of how the brain can exhibit inconsistent 
economic decision-making, a group of participants playing a ―trust 
 
 
 95. Id. at 1731. For a discussion of these results, see Jedediah Purdy, The Promise (and Limits) of 
Neuroeconomics, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (2006). 
 96. Chorvat & McCabe, supra note 67, at 1731. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Mauricio R. Delgado & James G. Dilmore, Social and Emotional Influences on Decision 
Making and the Brain, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 899, 905 (2008). 
 100. Id. at 900–01. 
 101. Id. at 901–02 (emphasis added). 
 102. Id. at 902–03. 
 103. Id. at 905. 
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game‖104 were experimentally given increased levels of the neuropeptide 
oxytocin.
105
 Oxytocin release in the brain is related to positive social 
interactions involving social attachment and affiliation, and is 
hypothesized to be involved in promoting trusting behavior.
106
 Researchers 
compared the economic decisions made by participants given a dose of 
oxytocin to a control group that received no dose.
107
 ―Investors‖ with the 
increased dose of the neuropeptide sent more money to the trustees in the 
game than those that received none.
108
 Thus, temporarily altering the 
chemistry of the brain caused people to judge risks differently. 
Evidence strongly suggests that some economic decision-making is 
related to brain functions that are irrational or inconsistent. The human 
thought process is not always cognitive and calculating. It is prone to error 
and mental shortcuts. People will not act rationally while valuing 
commodities, investors will certainly not act rationally when setting prices 
in financial markets, and collective bargaining will continue to produce 
inefficient results. Game theory, behavioral economics, and 
neuroeconomics do not have all the answers, but considering the strong 
evidence these fields have uncovered so far, it is time to stop 
oversimplifying human behavior and assuming we will all be rational all 
of the time—sometimes to the catastrophic detriment of many.109  
 
 
 104. Michael Kosfeld, Markus Heinrichs, Paul J. Zak, Urs Fischbacher & Ernst Fehr, Oxytocin 
Increases Trust in Humans, 435 NATURE 673, 673. The trust game is explained as follows. ―Both 
subjects receive an initial endowment of 12 monetary units (MU). The investor can send 0, 4, 8 or 12 
MU to the trustee. The experimenter triples each MU the investor transfers. After the investor‘s 
decision is made, the trustee is informed about the investor‘s transfer. Then the trustee has the option 
of sending any amount between zero and his total amount available back to the investor. For example, 
if the investor has sent 12MU, the trustee possesses 48MU (12MU own endowment + 36MU tripled 
transfer) and can, therefore choose any back transfer from 0 to 48MUs. The experimenter does not 
triple the back transfer. The investor‘s final payoff corresponds to the initial endowment minus the 
transfer to the trustee, plus the back transfer from the trustee. The trustee‘s final payoff is given by his 
initial endowment plus the tripled transfer of the investor, minus the back transfer to the investor. At 
the end of the experiment, the earned MU are exchanged into real money according to a publicly 
announced exchange rate . . . .‖ Id. 
 105. NEUROECONOMICS, supra note 56, at 10. 
 106. Kosfeld et al., supra note 104, at 673. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. The financial industry collapse of 2008 can be blamed on many of the irrationalities common 
to human behavior discussed in this Note. 
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VI. OVERCOMING CRITICISMS 
The brain uses different areas to solve different problems. Some critics 
have stated that this fails to refute the rational actor assumption.
110
 They 
concede that some areas of the brain experience greater neural activity 
during either emotional or moral decision-making, but contend that this 
correlation does not prove causation.
111
 Further, critics contend that 
neurological studies do not yet show us precisely how these brain 
mechanisms work and therefore are not valuable.
112
 Such criticisms ask 
the field of neuroeconomics to prove too much. It may be true that ―both 
behavioral law and economics and the underlying literature in cognitive 
psychology are far better at explaining that people often behave in ways 
inconsistent with traditional economic theory than they are at explaining 
why they do so.‖113 However, this is not a refutation of the theory‘s 
claims. Failing to understand completely how something works does not 
disprove the fact that it does in fact work. 
VII. SUGGESTIONS FOR CREATING MORE OPTIMAL AND JUST OUTCOMES  
―[E]mpirical critiques of the simple axiomatic approaches [of the 
neoclassical model], in the form of counterexamples, could lead to more 
general axiomatic systems that [are] more sensibly rooted in principles of 
psychology.‖114 For this reason, a behavioral and neuroeconomic approach 
should be promoted. If ―human behavior is the very currency in which law 
deals,‖115 and if ―law‘s behavior models [are to] serve as fulcra for the 
levers of law,‖116 than it makes little sense to defend behavioral models 
that have little evidentiary backing. Neuroeconomics adds weight to this 
contention by observing that parts of the brain associated with 
emotionality are active during such irrational outcomes. Moreover, ―[l]aw 
is intended to create context in which cooperative and other socially 
optimal behavior is beneficial.‖117 If we ignore actual behavior in our 
economic calculus, and use this calculus to structure law, how can we 
develop legal doctrine to produce the optimal amount of justice? 
 
 
 110. See Michael S. Pardo & Dennis Patterson, Philosophical Foundations of Law and 
Neuroscience, 2010 U. ILL L. REV. 1211, 1238–39 (2010). 
 111. Id. at 1238. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 31, at 446. 
 114. NEUROECONOMICS, supra note 56, at 4. 
 115. Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 31, at 407. 
 116. Id. at 416. 
 117. Chorvat & McCabe, supra note 67, at 1733. 
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Related to labor law, the results suggest that a more structured dispute 
resolution mechanism would benefit workers as well as ownership.
118
 It is 
certainly not necessary that such changes go so far as to interfere with 
Section 7 rights under the NLRA, nor property rights historically accorded 
to business owners. I do, however, aim to raise awareness of new 
possibilities that can be implemented either voluntarily or on a limited 
basis.  
For example, both arbitration and some forms of mediation could 
generate more Pareto-efficiency by limiting or discouraging each party‘s 
options for destructive behavior. This could reduce lockouts, strikes, 
permanent replacements, and smooth over a general atmosphere of 
political divisiveness and mistrust. Moreover, self-aware actors with a 
more nuanced understanding of human behavioral tendencies may be more 
effective at achieving a Pareto-efficient outcome, even in a standard 
negotiation setting. If both parties come to the table with similar 
knowledge, they could consciously work to avoid destructive and 
mistrustful behavior. Zero sum negotiations between ―rational actors,‖ 
which frequently occur in traditional labor negotiations, force unions and 
ownership to dig into trenches. Because labor negotiations, unlike 
financial market transactions, are generally conducted in a more personal 
setting, there is an increased likelihood for emotional—rather than 
rational—decisions.119 Consequently, some unions are now pushing for 
legislation that includes devices such as first contract arbitration.
120
 
While unions and management may resist giving up their ―contractual 
freedom,‖ they may do so unnecessarily and at the expense of efficiency 
and justice. Moreover, reliance on more structured price-setting techniques 
need not be seen as usurping union utility to workers. Some scholars have 
noted
121
 that recent developments in employment law such as the Civil 
 
 
 118. Chorvat, McCabe & Smith, supra note 45, at 56. The authors state neuroeconomics argues 
for laws that foster higher-trust relationships because they tend to be less costly and cheaper to both 
the participants and society. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See generally Susan J. T. Johnson, First Contract Arbitration: Effects on Bargaining and 
Work Stoppages, 63 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 585 (2009–2010) (discussing the Employee Free 
Choice Act and why unions support the inclusion of first contract arbitration). See also Theodore J. St. 
Antoine, ADR in Labor and Employment Law During the Past Quarter Century, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & 
EMP. L. 411 (2009–2010) (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of alternative dispute resolution in 
relation to labor law). 
 121. Bruce Kaufman, The Future of Collective Bargaining and its Impact on Dispute Resolution, 
in ARBITRATION 1999: QUO VADIS? THE FUTURE OF ARBITRATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 52ND ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 22–23 
(Jay E. Grenig & Steven Briggs eds., 2000). 
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Rights Act,
122
 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
123
 and 
ERISA
124
 have weakened unions by assigning the protection of workers to 
the government. However, this view underrates unions‘ necessity in 
protecting such rights. Workers need collective power more than ever to 
stand up for these rights; workers are not always aware of their rights, and 
can be emotionally and financially unable to use them. Thus, union roles 
are still critical in workplaces less prone to prolonged labor contract 
disputes and where workers are concurrently protected by statutory civil 
rights laws. Strikes are costly and strain relationships between union 
management and its members. They also engender workplace hostility 
after the negotiation has ended.  If their necessity can be reduced though 
reliance on more Pareto-efficient price setting techniques, and union 
resources can be instead directed toward protecting employee rights and 
organizing, this should be viewed as a positive path forward. 
Furthermore, while current doctrine intends to prioritize labor peace 
and economic productivity while discouraging work stoppages,
125
 it does 
so in a way that gives employers an inordinate amount of power. Labor 
may benefit from a dispute resolution technique where authority for price-
setting is not derived mainly from the economic leverage wielded by each 
party—especially in a political and economic backdrop where fiscal 
capital is far more mobile than human capital. In the current setting, 
especially, it is important to consider whether the notion of ―freedom of 
contract‖ really grants parties to price negotiations equal freedom. 
While there are reasons to be cautious about the scope of change 
justified by these new economic viewpoints, a new legal doctrine 
incorporating the limitations of ―freedom of contract‖ and human behavior 
into the calculus could help level the playing field and increase efficiency 
in a way that will produce not only more optimal outcomes, but also ones 
that are more just. However, one must still treat the experimental results 
discussed in this Note with some caution. ―Recent revisions in 
understanding human behavior greatly unsettle certain arguments against 
paternalism in law. They certainly do not make an affirmative case for 
paternalism; but they support a form of anti-antipaternalism.‖126 They do 
 
 
 122. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-e17 (2011)). 
 123. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified 
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2011)). 
 124. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 
829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2011)). 
 125. Klare, supra note 3, at 63 (commenting on the Boys Markets case). 
 126. Sunstein, supra note 53, at 1178. 
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not necessarily prove that a more regulated bargaining process will always 
be more efficient and just. Thus, this Note‘s suggested solutions, such as 
arbitration and mediation, should not be pursued without scrutiny of their 
own. It is enough to say, however, that the current system needs to be 
questioned and improved, and the status quo should no longer be taken for 
granted. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In order to improve the future for the American worker and American 
businesses, we must change the way we look at labor-management 
relations. We must broaden awareness of effective methods by which just 
and efficient negotiation and bargaining results can be accomplished. 
Parties simply informed of the mind‘s perils and shortfalls in an 
adversarial setting exposed by behavioral economics, game theory, and 
neuroeconomics may be less likely to be tripped up by their own 
inefficient tendencies. 
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